Hi, my name is Benjamin Valdes. I am a train operator for MTA- NYC Transit. My colleague, conductor Tramell Thompson has recently emailed you about the culture of “service over safety” here at Transit, but I would like to add a train operator’s perspective on the safety problem. As a train operator I am the person in the front of the train, “driving” it, while the conductor is positioned in the middle of the train to handle door operations and public address announcements.

I think the most striking example of the MTA ignoring safety issues is the aftermath of the deadly train accident in 2016 that killed construction flagger Louis Gray and seriously injured his coworker Jeffrey Flemming when both workers were hit by a G train in Brooklyn. The accident occurred while the workers were setting up flagging protection for the work that was to be performed on the tracks later that morning. The NTSB conducted an investigation and concluded that the MTA should “revise [their] flagging procedures to prohibit the movement of trains at greater than restricted speed while flagging protection is being established and require the Rail Control Center to communicate a flagger’s location to train dispatchers, tower operators, and train operators.” Well the first part of that recommendation relies on the second part being enforced. How am I as a train operator supposed to reduce the speed of my train where flagging protection is being established if the Rail Control Center (RCC) NEVER announces a flagger’s location to us? There is indeed a rule on the books that states that overnight and on weekends the RCC must “inform all trains in the affected area of the presence of employees on the right of way and [remind] Train Operators to operate with RESTRICTED SPEED AND EXTREME CAUTION and sound the horn if caution lights or employees are observed.” Not only does your recommendation go beyond just overnight and weekends, but the announcements they do make are not even specific to the “affected area” and are just general announcements reminding us of the rule on how to proceed through work areas. This gives me as a train operator absolutely no information about the whereabouts of someone setting up flagging protection in a particular area. A pilot program was done where flaggers could either stop all train movement in the area, have flaggers ride on a train to the work zone to place their flagging protection, or have an employee at the nearest station to warn train operators of the presence of workers on the tracks ahead. They ultimately decided to go with the employee at the nearest station to warn us of workers setting up flagging; but what happens when a train comes into the station that isn’t scheduled to stop there? Will the employee try to get the train operator’s attention over the radio instead? The same radios that have so many dead spots in the system and caused the derailment on the 1 line? On our lines that are equipped with Communications Based Train Control (CBTC), the exact location of the work zone is given to the train operator on their screen a few thousand feet in advance. The least they could do for us on the non-CBTC lines (the majority of the system) is let us know where the work zones are, over the radio. Even though there are a lot of dead spots, if you’re constantly repeating the locations of the work zone a train operator is bound to hear it at least once before they get to the work zone. The worst feeling as a train operator is to come flying around a curve in a tunnel and see those flashing lights or even worse, a worker, which by rule shouldn’t be passed at more than 10 mph. It is illegal for a commuter train to operate in passenger service without a working speedometer, yet it is legal for a subway train to operate without one. It is VERY easy to go over 10 mph in a work zone when you don’t have a speedometer. However if you refuse to operate a train with a broken speedometer you will be seen as a troublemaker and harassed, so nobody does. As a train operator I am also tasked with going down onto the tracks with no flagging protection to investigate when a train’s emergency brakes have been activated and to walk to/from trains on storage tracks adjacent to live train traffic to prepare trains for service or to store them for the evening. However since no one was killed doing these specific tasks yet, Transit has not come up with a safe way to perform these tasks. The hazard of walking on the tracks is exponentially compounded because it basically violates every OSHA standard in the book! We are walking on elevated structures with gaps larger than 2 inches between the ties, meaning we could fall through or at the very least, trip (OSHA standard 1910.28(b)(3)(i)(A)). We have to walk on these elevated structures in all types of weather, including snow and ice and they do not clear the walking-working surface for us (OSHA standard 1910.22(a)(3)). Whether above ground or underground, we have to walk on the tracks over live 600 volt third rails and people on this job have actually been ELECTROCUTED. Meanwhile they have not figured out a way to protect us from falling into or onto the third rail (OSHA standard 1910.28(b)(6)(i)). 

Another example of safety being ignored is the poor visibility underground. Unfortunately since Covid there has been a spike in the amount of emotionally disturbed people that have been walking on the tracks, unauthorized, not only within the station limits but between stations as well. The lighting in the tunnels is extremely poor. The headlights (what we call “sealed beams”) are not very strong. I’ve been told by a train service supervisor that the sealed beams are only there to alert people on the tracks, not to increase the train operator’s visibility; they even tried LED sealed beams on a few trains but they only ended up blinding the train operators going in the opposite direction. Many of our windshields (what we call the “vision glass”) are dirty, scratched up, and never cleaned, repaired, or replaced. The most egregious vision issue which could be fixed within minutes is the huge glare that comes into our operating cabs from the passenger area on the new technology trains. On the older trains there was just a small window where light could come in and cause a minor glare on our vision glass. However on the newer trains the entire top half of the cab door has a window which allows light to bounce off of our vision glass creating this humongous glare. Luckily we can still see signals and authorized workers wearing vests, but anything else like an unauthorized person would be difficult to spot in a split second on a vehicle which cannot stop on a dime because of its massive weight and momentum. By rule we are not allowed to cover the windows to block the light from coming in because it is considered “unsightly” to do so and the MTA is pandering to so-called “rail fans” who wish to look out the front of the train. To be honest it should be illegal for passengers to be anywhere near the cab door because in a case where the brakes fail and a collision is imminent (just like the recent 1 train derailment) that cab door is our only means of egress. Passengers are always leaning up against our cab door, blocking that means of egress. There are also rules which state that we are to report when a cab window is allowing too much light and when the lighting in the tunnels is poor, but those rules are extremely disingenuous because every new technology train has the horrible glare and every tunnel is poorly lit, so those rules are just there to cover their rear-ends when something inevitably happens so they can blame us for not reporting the hazard. Meanwhile if you do correctly report that the hazards exist on all new-tech trains and in all tunnels, again you will be seen as a troublemaker and harassed, so nobody does. Dozens of people are struck and killed by NYC subway trains every year. That number reached 88 in 2022. I am willing to bet that at least one of those people would have been saved by simple changes to the tunnel lighting, poor vision glasses and massive light glare.

A third example of safety being completely ignored is fire hazards. Ever since the deadly fire which took the life of train operator Garrett Goble in March of 2020, the MTA has instituted NO safety features which would help us in a fire. In fact, the MTA has actually enacted a policy which would create MORE fire hazards, by allowing e-bikes on subways and buses. In fact, there was just a major fire on a subway train in Toronto, Canada that was caused by en e-bike whose lithium ion battery exploded. Not only is a ban on e-bikes needed, but enforcement of the rule is necessary. The fire that killed Mr. Goble in 2020 was caused by a shopping cart that caught on fire. Shopping carts were and currently are still banned from the Transit system. Yet if you see someone with a shopping cart in the system and report it to rail control, rather than stopping the train they tell you to keep the train moving and signal for police en route. Police never show up so they are making the conscious decision that moving the train is more important than the safety of their passengers and crew. If you refuse to move your train because of a shopping cart, again you will be seen as a troublemaker and harassed, so nobody does. The MTA also refuses to put fire extinguishers on our trains. Fire extinguishers every 600 feet in the tunnels are no help if you’re between 2 of them, 300 feet away from each of them in heavy smoke. I need a fire extinguisher on my train, the way Long Island Railroad trains do, mere feet from my operating position. 

Thank you for your time.